(CNN) -- "We need long-term to take out ISIS'
leadership, to degrade their operational
capabilities, to cut off their financing sources, to
go after them in a comprehensive way to cut off
their ability to do the things we've seen them do."
Those were the words of State Department deputy
spokeswoman Marie Harf on Monday --
suggesting the Obama Administration is preparing
to do much more against the Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq than deprive it of the Mosul Dam.
They sounded much like the checklist used to
degrade al Qaeda over a decade.
Until the sudden capture of Mosul in June, ISIS
was of concern to Western governments but not a
pressing priority. Since then, the threat to
Baghdad, the plight of the Yazidi minority in
northern Iraq, direct threats to U.S. interests and
citizens and now the gruesome execution of
American journalist James Foley have galvanized
an unlikely coalition.
Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Jabhat
al Nusrah, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria: all have
the same adversary.
On Wednesday, President Obama said:
"There has to be a common effort to
extract this cancer so it does not
spread." French President Francois
Hollande concurs. In an interview with
Le Monde Wednesday he called for a
"comprehensive strategy against this
structured group, which has access to
substantial funding and to very
sophisticated weapons, and which
threatens countries such as Iraq, Syria
or Lebanon."
The first step in taking down al Qaeda
central was the invasion of
Afghanistan to deprive it of living
space. This time, the United States
hopes others -- specifically the
Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi armed
forces -- will do that part of the job
against ISIS, with a little help from
U.S. drones and F-16s.
Even so, killing off an organization
that is now much more potent than al
Qaeda or its affiliates will depend on a
lot of things going right in a region
where much has gone wrong.
Here are just a few of the challenges.
1. ISIS has considerable territory
In eight months, ISIS has taken control of
swathes of western and northern Iraq, and
expanded its presence in northern Syria. For
hundreds of miles along the Euphrates and Tigris
rivers, ISIS is the power in the land; it now holds
an area larger than the neighboring state of
Jordan. While al Qaeda never really held territory
beyond training camps and caves in remote parts
of Afghanistan, ISIS controls cities (Mosul, Tikrit
and Tal Afar in Iraq; Raqqa in Syria) and oil
fields, main roads and border crossings. And it
possesses more military hardware than some
national armies after seizing both Iraqi and Syrian
military bases and armories.
Critically, ISIS is able to use both
Syrian and Iraqi soil in a much more
muscular way than al Qaeda and the
Taliban used the mountain tracks
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
This gives it tactical flexibility and
safe havens. Although its Syrian
strongholds have come under aerial
attack recently by the Syrian air force,
the group retains control of Raqqa
and Deir Ezzour provinces in the north and east of
the country, and has in recent days seized villages
close to Aleppo, some 250 miles from the border
with Iraq. It also holds villages and towns along
the Syrian border with Turkey.
As ISIS threatens to overwhelm other rebel groups
(see below), especially the remnants of the Free
Syrian Army, one critical factor will be the Syrian
regime's tactics. Until recently it has focused its
fire on other groups in securing Damascus and
retaking Homs. There are signs it now sees ISIS
as a clear and present danger; ISIS has seized
several military bases in Raqqa province, and
threatens to take the important Tabqa air base.
In the last week, the Assad regime has stepped
up its use of air-strikes against ISIS, no doubt
aware of the coincidental benefit of showing the
West that Syrian help is required to tackle ISIS.
ISIS could be squeezed from several directions,
but it would require co-ordinated commitment
from Syria -- which has other battles to fight and
may still see ISIS as a useful counterbalance
against other rebel groups -- as well as the Iraqi
army and the Kurds. Desperation has led Baghdad
to co-operate with the Kurds. Whether that is
sustainable is open to question.
2. ISIS has men, money, munitions
Unlike most jihadist groups, ISIS has
some serious weaponry and plenty of
seasoned fighters. In an assault on a
major Syrian army base earlier this
month, ISIS deployed three suicide
bombers and dozens of well-armed
fighters. A long battle ended with the
fall of the base (one of the last held
by the regime in Raqqa) and --
according to Syrian activists -- the
summary execution of dozens of
soldiers.
It was symbolic of ISIS' ability to
conduct complex operations
simultaneously in theaters hundreds of
miles apart. The Syrian Observatory
for Human Rights claims ISIS gained
6,300 new recruits -- 80 percent of
them Syrian and the rest foreign -- in
July alone. While U.S. officials say the
number of active fighters probably
numbers some 15,000, Iraqi analysts believe ISIS
may be able to field three times that number.
A significant number are from Europe, Australia
and the former Soviet Union. On Wednesday,
Austrian prosecutors said nine people had been
arrested on suspicion of intending to join Islamic
militants in Syria, the latest indication of the
stream of radicalized young Muslims lured to the
promised land.
ISIS paints a picture of this land through a
sophisticated outreach program on social media
and through its English-language online
publication, Dabiq, which is full of accounts of the
coming showdown with "crusader armies,"
appeals to Muslims to come to the Islamic State
and promises that "it is only a matter of time and
patience before it reaches Palestine to fight the
barbaric jews."
The aim of creating a Caliphate gives
the group a mission that appeals to
many young jihadists in Syria, Iraq
and beyond. It's a goal that gives
ISIS' campaign religious underpinning,
and is constantly referred to in the
group's literature.
ISIS has shown a ruthless discipline
in its military tactics, forcing the Iraqi
military to fight on several fronts at
once and using mobile groups of a few dozen
fighters as a first wave in attacking targets. It has
a well-deserved reputation for accepting
casualties in the pursuit of an objective and uses
probing operations to test defenses (as in Mosul)
and to keep opponents off-balance. In July, ISIS
fighters attacked gas installations in Homs
province, which diverted Syrian forces, only to
then launch more concerted assaults on targets
further east.
According to the Institute for the Study of War
(ISW) , which follows ISIS' campaign closely, "the
breadth of these linked offensives across Iraq and
Syria illustrate the ISIS priority objective of
establishing territorial integrity for the Caliphate,
and are evidence of the large military capacity
ISIS still possesses nearly two months after the
fall of Mosul.
"As continued military successes from
increasingly unified theatres of operation fuel the
ISIS war machine, a hardened ISIS exterior line is
likely to allow ISIS forces to pursue further
expansion," ISW says.
ISIS control of border crossings is a source of
revenue, as are bank raids in the towns and cities
they have seized. The group has seized oil
refineries, and may make as much as $2 million a
day from its control of fuel supplies in northern
Iraq . They also hold the al-Omar oilfield in Raqqa.
3. ISIS is strangling the Syrian rebels
Perhaps the most immediate -- and
most difficult --- challenge in
reversing the ISIS tide is preventing it
from killing off what remains of the
more moderate Syrian opposition to
Bashar al Assad. Already driven out of
Homs through starvation, these
groups are now caught between the
hammer of ISIS and the anvil of the
Syrian army in and around Aleppo.
ISIS is closing in on Aleppo from the
north , while the regime cuts off other
routes.
Brian Fishman, who has followed the rise of ISIS
longer than most, says that supporting the Free
Syrian Army earlier might have blunted ISIS, "but
that's a pretty hollow position if one also gives
Syrian rebel factions a pass for tolerating and
even embracing ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusrah
through late 2012."
The remnants of the Free Syrian Army are
disjointed and deflated -- and deeply resentful of
failed western promises to provide the sort of
military aid that would have tipped the military
balance. Elements of the anti-ISIS Islamic Front
are also starved of resources, and even Jabhat al
Nusrah, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, has shifted
its focus rather than take on ISIS.
After its gains north of Aleppo, ISIS may also be
able to extend its control to parts of the Syrian-
Turkish border, cutting off resupply routes for
other groups. Syrian activists say ISIS fighters are
now just a few miles from the town of Azaz, close
to the border.
Can the U.S. and its partners help revive Syrian
rebels to the point they can take on ISIS before
the military balance in Syria tips decisively
against them?
The record is not encouraging. Exactly three years
ago, President Obama said the United States
would lead the effort in "pressuring President
Assad to get out of the way of this [democratic]
transition, and standing up for the universal rights
of the Syrian people - along with others in the
international community."
Assad is still standing. The rebels are
in disarray. And the Syrian people can
only imagine what universal rights
might look like.
4. ISIS hasn't over-reached as yet.
But there are signs
Much of ISIS' success has derived
from its ability to strike local deals
with Sunni tribes in both Syria and
Iraq -- either in the face of a common enemy or
because tribal leaders see opposition as futile
and/or suicidal. In Syria, for example, ISIS
commanders co-opted the Sharabia tribe in joint
operations against local Kurds.
It has shown merciless cruelty to enemies,
beheading Syrian soldiers and executing Shia
civilians and soldiers in Iraq. Displaying severed
heads and other draconian demonstrations of
ruthlessness are calculated to create a climate of
fear among would-be adversaries. Human Rights
Watch noted reports this week that ISIS had
"executed as many as 700 members of the
Sheitaat tribe in Deir al-Zour governorate, many
of them civilians."
This ruthlessness is the ultimate form of
totalitarian control -- but controlling such a vast
area is only possible with the acquiescence of the
civilian population. And this may change,
especially if the new Iraqi Prime Minister extends
an olive branch to the Sunni tribes; and if those
who would oppose ISIS, both in Iraq and Syria,
get support in the form of intelligence and
weapons and support from the air.
Dawn Chatty, a social anthropologist at Oxford
University, says that in north-eastern Syria "the
Bedouin are very hard to terrorize, and the
Bedouin will really come back." The head of the
Sheitaat tribe has already called on other groups
to join it in opposing ISIS.
But ISIS has shown itself to be smarter than its
equally ruthless predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq,
which ultimately alienated Sunni tribes and led
them to sign up for the U.S.-sponsored
"Awakening" against extremism. It has provided
food, fuel and security to populations on the brink
of destitution after three years of civil war in
Syria. And as Yochi Dreazen notes in Foreign
Policy , ISIS "has generally allowed the local
bureaucrats in charge of hospitals, law
enforcement, trash pickup, and other municipal
services to stay in their jobs." Its sharia courts
have cut crime -- albeit more by cruel example
than by due process.
While Raqqa is the flagship of ISIS' model of
governance, there are other Syrian towns -- such
as al-Bab and Manbij -- where it has shown
organizational skills. Charles Caris at the Institute
for the Study of War says that "as ISIS takes sole
control over territory, it expands to provide more
services, often operating the heavy equipment
needed to repair sewer and electricity lines."
But running towns and dispensing
services is a costly business, and
there are only so many banks to
empty. As Caris observes: "The
immediate provision of aid and
electricity, for example, does not
translate into the creation of a durable
economy."
5. The Iraqi government still needs to
get its act together
In some ways, Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki was the best recruiting
sergeant ISIS could wish for,
repeatedly alienating the Sunni
minority with heavy-handed tactics against
dissent, followed by indiscriminate bombing when
ISIS took Fallujah in January. Maliki became
identified with a chauvinistic Shia outlook heavily
influenced by Iran.
Now Haidar al-Abadi -- the Prime Minister in
waiting -- has the opportunity to win back the
support of senior military commanders who had
become disillusioned with the way Iraq's security
forces had been so brazenly politicized, and lure
the Sunni tribes back into political process. And
that would starve ISIS of the "host" on which it
has thrived for the past few months.
Some Sunni tribal leaders have already make it
clear they will deal with al-Abadi, if the price is
right. Iraqi analysts say this price includes an end
to the allocation of ministries and other arms of
government purely on the basis of partisan
patronage.
The Kurds seem ready to give al-Abadi a chance.
Hoshyar Zebari has returned to his post as Iraqi
Foreign Minister in Baghdad, telling CNN's Becky
Anderson Wednesday: "We've rejoined the
caretaker government."
After the recapture of the Mosul Dam, the Iraqi
army has launched another attempt to retake
Tikrit. But so far ISIS is still in control of most of
the town. There is a long way to go before real
progress against ISIS can be demonstrated.
6. The international coalition needs
to stick together
The events of the last few weeks,
especially the horrendous brutality of
ISIS that has mobilized global opinion
and the existential threat to Iraq as a
state, has concentrated minds from
the Gulf to Europe and Washington.
"Suddenly, a common enemy has joined mutually
distrustful players in the making of a coalition
against ISIS -- just the kind of multilateralism
that the U.S. President favors," writes George
Packer in The New Yorker .
But does that coalition have willpower and
cohesion to pursue what will be a costly -- and
long-term -- mission? Will the U.S. be ready to
use greater military force in Iraq in support of
both the Kurds and the Iraqi military, including the
deployment of Special Forces, given that the
Obama administration sees ending the war in Iraq
as a major achievement? And will the new
government in Baghdad -- still likely to be a
largely Shia coalition -- make enough
concessions to both the Kurds and Sunnis to
rekindle the 'concept' of Iraq?
In Syria, will the friends of the opposition,
including the U.S., Turkey and the Gulf states be
ready to prioritize the goal of helping rebel
groups, including even Islamist elements, against
ISIS, over the long-term aim of removing al
Assad? Time is short.
Frederic Hoff of the Atlantic Council argues that
"if, for example, the [opposition] Coalition were to
establish itself in northern Syria, its associated
military elements would need -- among other
things -- the means to neutralize regime military
aviation and ISIS ground forces." That's a lot of
means.
Some former US military officials have spoken of
the need to put 10,000 to 15,000 US troops on
the ground to "roll back" ISIS. Brian Fishman, a
Fellow at the New America Foundation, writes in
War On the Rocks that "10,000-15,000 troops
vastly understates the true commitment, which
will actually require years, direct military action
on both sides of the Iraq/Syria border, tens (if not
hundreds) of billions of dollars, and many more
than 15,000 troops."
And Fishman takes a pessimistic view of the
prospects of getting rid of ISIS any time soon.
"The political consensus to incur the risks and
costs of destroying ISIS is tremendously unlikely.
And even then, success hinges on dramatic
political shifts in both Iraq and Syria that under
the best of circumstances will require years."
Which is where we started: the "long-term." And
even then.
